an agenda setter which is capable of limiting options available not only for the national but also the EU legislator. 11 The most recent evidence in this regard is Directive 2011/24 which regulates the rights of patients in cross-border health care. The EU legislator -as a consequence of the Court's case law -was de facto left with only limited choices to make. 12 These considerations award a reappraisal of the existing case law.
The aim of this article is to give a reconstructive account regarding the legitimacy of the Court's case law in the field of patient migration. In contrast to the existing literature this article seeks to justify the use of primary EU law in the field of health care by making reference to secondary EU health care law, that is, most notably Article 20 Regulation 883/2004.
Conceptually this approach is based on Dworkin's idea which treats law as integrity. Briefly stated, respecting the integrity of law requires one to look back in history in order to establish whether principles have been applied consistently over time. This will be the focus of section 1 of this article. Yet integrity in law also makes it necessary to 'look across' in order to study whether principles are established consistently across the law. This will be the focus of sections 2 and 3. 13 Law as integrity means that every judge interprets the law in accordance with its best possible reading. In order to establish whether health care constitutes a service in accordance with the Treaty the starting point is Article 57 TFEU which stipulates that '[s]ervices shall be considered to be "services" within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration. ' In legal positivist thinking the provision clearly constitutes an example of 'open texture', that is, one finds 'duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt'. 15 The existence of doubt is also evidenced by the disagreement which is usually rare to find between the Court and its Advocate Generals. Yet it surfaced on the question as to whether free movement of services ought to be applicable in relation to health care. The two Advocate
Generals developed their (dissenting) arguments in the light of the Court's (earlier) case law in the field of education. Such mutual references are plausible because health care and education are both public services for which 'many of the same arguments apply ' . 16 Yet in Humbel 17 the Court had found that education does not constitute a service which is provided for remuneration, whereas in health care the Court arrived at the opposite conclusion.
Two preliminary observations can be made about the relationship between education and health care. First, and based on the involvement of solidarity, Somek argues that the Court should have pursued the same approach it had chosen in public education and decided that health care is beyond the reach of the Treaty. 18 This is in line with Hervey who considers solidarity to be 'a buttress against market law'. 19 Second, Shuibhne argues that the two strands and the selective citation of existing authority.' 20 If her finding is persuasive this presents a serious problem for the Court because legal reasoning and legitimacy are interconnected. 21 It is therefore necessary to examine whether a plausible argument can be made which allows for treating health care and education differently or, alternatively, whether it must be concluded that one was decided wrongly. One can argue that judges are faced with hard cases when it comes to health care.
INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXTUALISM
The story of cross-border movement begins -as is well known -with Mr Kohll's daughter who was insured in Luxembourg but had received dental treatment by an orthodontist established in Germany. In line with Luxembourg national law but also It is this argument which seems conceptually most closely connected to 'remuneration'.
For this reason alone, it is presumably the most interesting and promising one. Consequently, it deserves to be addressed in more detail. Davies undertakes an elaborate attempt to conceptually distinguish education from health care depending on how funding is organised.
With an emphasis on the transaction aspect, Davies argues that a service is provided for remuneration when a private insurance company pays for a hospital but also if, for example, the state pays a private company in order to provide a specific service. Under these circumstances a service will undoubtedly be offered for remuneration. Also, a service is provided for remuneration when the state specifically 'sells' this service to the public.
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In the context of health care we find a specific version of the transaction problem. In using a 'hermeneutic "trick".' 46 Watts clearly shows that attempts of conceptualising the Court's case law along the lines of textualism does not deliver convincing results. It is therefore necessary to find an alternative approach which provides more persuasive answers.
LAW AS INTEGRITY
It is submitted that law as integrity offers a promising alternative in order to conceptualise the case law of the Court. Dworkin explains the character of integrity through an analogy in which novelists meet in order to write a chain novel. Each of the novelists involved in this project is responsible to write one specific section or chapter of that novel. They are only able to do this in a meaningful way, if they interpret the story that has been written so far. 47 Their task but also their technique compares with the one applied by a common law judge 48 who needs to engage with history as a consequence of the practice of stare decisis. 49 The judge must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own. TFEU] which specifically addresses the issue of (higher) education.
The analysis seems to have reached a point where it is possible to bring together the different threads and provide a preliminary answer to the question which stood at the beginning of this first part: is health care a service provided for remuneration? Clearly the analysis of the legal history showed that health care has received considerable attention by the EU legislator already from the beginning of European integration. As suggested, one of the earliest pieces of secondary legislation covered aspects of cross-border movement of patients even if only as an accessory to and in order to improve the functioning of the internal market. In comparison, education (legally) had a somewhat slow(er) start than health care. 59 Therefore, it would appear -from the perspective of integrity -that a different treatment of education and health care is justifiable.
And yet, when it comes to integrity, it is not enough to simply 'look back' in time. It is also necessary to 'look across' and examine as to whether there exists consistency horizontally in relation to the relevant principles, that is, 'across the range of the legal standards the community now enforces'. 60 The point which therefore needs to be developed further in this article is whether the Court's activity in the field of health care has created some incoherence with the established principles. The framework of reference which will be used is based on the principles of integration and coordination. Only once consistency of these principles is established horizontally, is it possible to have a satisfactory answer to the question, which is at 
The Principle of Coordination
The characteristic of the principle of coordination is that it preserves the substance of boundaries, but additionally seeks to make boundaries more permeable. One consequence of the preservation of boundaries is that the authority of Member States, which is to be found within these boundaries, remains. 61 From a constitutional perspective therefore it can be argued that integration, which will be discussed in more detail below, is linked to sovereignty and the authority to act, 62 whereas coordination impacts only on the autonomy, that is, the capacity to act. 63 Coordination can be categorised into perfect and imperfect coordination. affiliation under all circumstances. Member States remain entitled to put in place certain restrictions of free movement law. According to Article 52 TFEU, derogations are possible based on public policy, public security or public health. In addition, the Court has developed 'mandatory requirements' which provide grounds of justifications in order to limit the free movement law. 71 The difficult question that remains, however, is to establish what type of regulatory framework constitutes an acceptable or legitimate restriction on freedom?
In order to develop a legitimate balance of such a framework the Court usually draws on the principle of proportionality. The principle needs to address the impact the framework of the EU has on waiting lists and the scope of treatment. In health care it is the concept of solidarity which is 'submitted to one or the other version of a proportionality test'. 72 The aim of proportionality is to protect specifically recognised interests. 73 The principle of proportionality is especially useful because it allows to balance 'a liberal rights-based constitutional rationality with a strong commitment to a welfare state'. 74 Yet the essential problem with the proportionality test is that the various versions of it are all based on an 'openended formula'. 75 Therefore, the proportionality test is sometimes considered to simply conceal political decisions behind a veil of verbose, albeit substantively weak, legal reasoning. 76 In order to establish whether the Court upheld the principle of coordination to a similar degree in comparison to the Regulation, the pivotal question to consider is how the proportionality test deals with the two critical parameters of time and treatment. Yet, the question of whether a specific treatment is 'medically justifiable' constitutes no longer a problem of interpretation but, if we apply MacCormick's framework, one of 'classification'. 82 This finding goes beyond pure semantics because the question whether specific factual circumstances fit a described class, transforms a problem of interpretation into one of fact. 83 While generally a court needs to make a decision about facts and law in one judgment, in the EU context we encounter a strict 'division of functions' 84 between the national courts and the ECJ. This means that the ECJ at most wields the authority of persuasion to impose its preferences on Member States. 85 In the Dutch case of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms the specific treatment in question was not covered by national insurance rules. According to the Dutch decree on sickness insurance benefits in kind, medical and surgical care, the treatment provided by a general practitioner and a specialist is only covered if it is considered 'normal in the professional circles concerned'. 86 There are two ways how to interpret the word 'normal' in this context: it can be understood either with reference to the 'national' or alternatively 'international' medical circles. 87 While the Court accepted that the phrase in question ' [was] open to a number of interpretations', 88 it concluded nevertheless that it needed to be interpreted as 'sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science'. 89 If the relevant norm were to be interpreted in a way that it only covers 'treatment habitually carried out on national territory and scientific interpretation of the legal practice seems to be that the Bulgarian legislator can simply adjust the law to its realities and remove from the list of covered treatments the wording 'other operations on the eyeball' and 'high-technology radiotherapy for oncological and nononcological conditions' if the health care system only intends to offer treatment which amounts to a complete removal of the eyeball ('enucleation'). 98 Therefore it seems obvious that the Bulgarian legislator has retained its authority.
Davies has made the observation that often because of the direct application of free movement rights of the Treaty they can provide a useful and powerful tool for the court to foster integration 'where secondary legislation does exist, but does not grant the rights desired'. 99 At least in the field of health care this finding is not supported. In fact, the conclusion must be the other way around. The examples studied suggest that the Court draws on secondary 97 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op.cit. supra note 25, para 103. 
The Principle of Integration
Above it has been argued above that education and health care come from a different chain of EU law and also that health care law coordinates, whereas education integrates systems.
However, to the extent that the Court removes any barriers to free movement of patients, arguably, health care is based on the principle of integration. And yet it would appear that there remains a difference between integration in health care and education. Integration in education has abolished the boundaries of membership, whereas integration in health care has only abolished the functional boundaries of health care systems. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that that education is no longer based on the law on free movement of services but on non-discrimination/citizenship law, whereas health care law is still exclusively driven by the law on free movement of services. Thus, it is still necessary to establish whether the principle of coordination can be accommodated with the principle of integration as developed by the Court in health care. In the discussion about coordination in health care, the requirement of authorisation constitutes a focal point because depending on its nature it can either preserve or undermine the integrity of existing boundaries. This in turn then either fosters or hinders integration. While boundaries or the ruins of them are not necessarily an absolute barrier to free movement, they are nevertheless an obstacle to it. It therefore comes with little surprise that the ECJ considered the legal requirement of prior authorisation -imposed on patients who intend to undergo health care treatment in another EU Member State -to constitute a restriction on free movement of services which can only be upheld if justifiable. 101 In this context an oddity regarding the qualification of what constitutes an obstacle to free movement law needs to be examined. While for some types of treatment, i.e. non-hospital treatment, the Court found national laws, which require prior authorisation, to be in conflict with the Treaty, it refused to come to the same conclusion in relation to secondary EU law, i.e. of the Court's intervention. 107 Pareto-efficiency embodies another important demand of integrity, namely that a government has 'equal concern' for the treatment of its citizens. 108 It may be disputed, from an empirical perspective, whether the case actually achieves this result but it is nevertheless important to note that both the Court and the Advocate General seem to make their arguments in this contextual framework. Grzelczyk. 114 The obvious criticism raised against the Court then was that the micro-level findings were simply scaled up to the macro-level when the kernel of the problem would be that 'one Baumbast and one Grzelczyk cannot really constitute an unreasonable burden upon the public purse -but ten-thousand Baumbasts and ten-thousand Grzelczyks might well have some more appreciable effect on the welfare resources of the host state.' 115 While the Court was of the opinion that free movement of patients would have no considerable effects on solidarity in the context of non-hospital care, it reached a different conclusion in relation to hospital care. The judges assumed that '[i]t is well known that the number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the way in which they are organised and the facilities with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be possible.' 116 The Court consequently accepted, without the need for further detailed evidence, 117 that the requirement of authorisation constitutes a necessary tool in order to control costs but also avoid wastage of resources.
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And yet critics of the Court are nevertheless of the opinion that free movement of patients would amount to the 'Killing of National Health and Insurance Systems' or the 'Corroding [of] Social Solidarity.' 119 The issue is important and therefore needs to be studied in more detail. The gist of the argument critics make is based on the planning argument.
According to them the case law of the Court undermined Member States' ability to assign resources and control costs through, e.g., the use of waiting lists. 120 The Court, through its focus on the individual patient ignores, so argue the critics, the 'opportunity costs' which accumulate whenever limited resources are used in one way instead of another. 121 The reasons for their scepticism may also have to do with the fact that in the real world there are relatively few Pareto-superior situations. 122 Nevertheless, in the remainder of this Chapter it will be argued that their concerns appear to be unfounded for two reasons.
THE ANOMALY OF THE EXCEPTION
In contrast to critics of the Court it is argued that patients, while being on a waiting list, can develop additional health conditions which can increase the overall 'costs-per-patient.' And yet quite possibly only some of these additional costs will exclusively affect the health care budget, whereas other costs will simply be externalised to other budget posts, such as welfare, or alternatively they are 'privatised', e.g. to the members of a family who takes care of a patient. Furthermore, poor health of a population, due to long waiting lists, can even have macro-economic consequences because a population becomes, for example, overall less productive. 123 In van Riet the Court made reference especially to this point when it argued that 'the degree of pain or the nature of the patient's disability … might, for example, make it impossible or extremely difficult for him [the patient] to carry out a professional activity'.
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Without developing these points fully, this much is obvious: if one does not take adequately into account the costs of waiting lists, this necessarily distorts the findings made in relation to opportunity costs. Consequently not each and every shortening of waiting lists necessarily amounts to increased costs of a health care system. And yet, there obviously comes a point, however difficult to locate, where a health care system with longer waiting times is cheaper to run in comparison with a system that operates with shorter waiting lists. It is then that the no-impact-approximation, as outlined above, is violated because Member States find themselves in a situation in which unless they pour more funds into the system -which increases the quantity of solidarity -some other patients will have to live with extended waiting times and this will impact on their welfare.
A different way of looking at the same issue would be that there comes a point where EU health care law has used up all its 'efficiency-savings' which means that either more solidarity is needed or EU health care law is beginning to have an impact on how national health care systems have to be managed. The probability for this scenario to happen increases the broader the anomaly of integration is defined. Nevertheless, it is possible to notice a tendency that has developed over time which appears to limit the circumstances when a patient is entitled to treatment in another Member State without the need for authorisation. 132 Overall Advocate General Sharpston's cost-focussed approach appears to be conceptually preferable because it is in line with the no-impact approximation and the Court seems to follow. 133 Overall it seems that the anomaly of integration created by the Court has been gradually reduced in its scope.
To conclude: the abolition of the authorisation mechanism constitutes an anomaly which has led to the integration of health care systems by abolishing functional boundaries. 
Conclusion
Over the last decade or so the law on cross-border movement of patients has gained some momentum. One critical factor in this development has been the Court. The interpretation of the law on the free movement of services resulted in its application in the field of migration of patients. In reaction to its jurisprudence the Court has faced some considerable criticism over the years. The aim of this article was therefore to undertake a (re-)appraisal of this criticism through an in-depth conceptual analysis of the Court's legal reasoning. The approach chosen for this article was based on Dworkin's conceptual idea which treats law as integrity.
Consequently it was necessary to examine and accommodate the 'consistency' of the Court's treatment of the education cases in relation to health care. Furthermore, it became also necessary to examine the consistency of the two strands of health care law, namely secondary EU law, here in particular Regulation 883/2004, and the case law which is based on the Treaty.
The argument made was that there are no conflicting principles at work between health care and education. In contrast to health care, and based on vertical consistency, education was not an area which was regulated in some way by EU law. This is very much in contrast to health care which was considered important for the functioning of the internal market and also suggests that free movement of people is somewhat different from the other free movement laws. It is a relatively recent development that education, broadly understood, is important for the functioning of the internal market. However, the consequence of this observation is that the 
